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A B S T R A C T
This article summarizes and extends the main lines of theo-
rizing on public opinion on European integration. We test
theories of economic calculus and communal identity in a
multi-level analysis of Eurobarometer data. Both economic
calculus and communal identity are influential, but the latter
is stronger than the former. We theorize how the political
consequences of identity are contested and shaped – that is
to say, politically cued – in national contexts. The more
national elites are divided, the more citizens are cued to
oppose European integration, and this effect is particularly
pronounced among citizens who see themselves as exclus-
ively national. A model that synthesizes economic, identity,
and cue theory explains around one-quarter of variation at
the individual level and the bulk of variation at the national
and party levels.
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What drives citizens to support or oppose European integration? The
question is as old as the European Union, and it has been the subject of some
one hundred articles, yet there is no scholarly consensus on the answer. There
are three main families of explanation. Most research on the topic builds on
trade theory to conceptualize a calculus of economic costs and benefits. The
presumption is that citizens evaluate the economic consequences of European
integration for themselves and for the groups of which they are part, and that
such consequences motivate their attitudes. An alternative line of explanation
draws on the psychology of group membership to examine how social iden-
tities, including, above all, national identities, constrain support for European
integration. These two families of theorizing have often been pitted against
one another as mutually exclusive conceptualizations. But a new line of
research, drawing on cognitive and social psychology, challenges this
either/or thinking by examining how political cues – grounded in ideology
or in elite communication – mediate the effect of economic calculation and
community membership.
These approaches conceive the European Union in contrasting ways.
Economic theories view the EU as a regime that facilitates economic exchange,
with profound distributional consequences for individuals arising from
differences in asset mobility and for countries arising from varieties of capi-
talism. Social identity theory conceives of the European Union as a polity
overarching established territorial communities, and considers how public
opinion is constrained by citizens’ conceptions of their identities. Cue theory
regards the European Union as an extension of domestic politics, and infers
that public attitudes are therefore guided by domestic ideology and domestic
political organizations.
This article has three purposes. First, we take stock of the field to convey
the current state of knowledge and, hence, our point of departure. The study
of public opinion on European integration is fast-moving, and it is useful to
compare the explanations that are now on the table. Our second purpose is
to evaluate the relative causal power of the two most compelling explanations
– economic theory and identity theory – in a way that proponents of each
would find reasonable. In earlier work we find that both theories bite, but
that identity appears the more powerful influence (Hooghe and Marks, 2004).
Our third purpose is to build on this analysis to theorize how economic calcu-
lation and identity are cued by elites. Given that the European Union is rarely
foremost in citizens’ minds, we need to understand how interests and identity
come to bear on European integration. The resulting model explains slightly
more than one-quarter of the variance at the individual level and the bulk of
variance at the country and party levels.
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Theorizing support for European integration
Economic models
European integration has engendered new forms of competition and, hence,
new inequalities (Kriesi and Lachat, 2004). In general, trade liberalization and
increased factor mobility advantage those with higher levels of human
capital, and hurt those with less (Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Gabel 1998a,
1998b; Inglehart, 1970). Trade liberalization increases the international substi-
tutability of labor because firms are more able to shift production across
borders, and this intensifies job insecurity for less-skilled workers (Rodrik,
1997). International economic openness puts pressure on welfare systems and
shifts the burden of taxation from mobile factors of production to immobile
factors (Huber and Stephens, 2001; Scharpf, 2000). Following Gabel (1998b),
we hypothesize that respondents’ general level of education picks up these
mobility effects (education).
Economic internationalization affects the relative scarcity of assets in a
national economy depending on prior factor endowments (Brinegar and Jolly,
2005). According to the Heckscher–Ohlin theorem, trade benefits individuals
who own factors with which the national economy is relatively well endowed
and hurts individuals who own factors that are relatively scarce (Mayda and
Rodrik, 2002; O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2001). Hence, in the most capital-rich
member states we expect unskilled workers to be Euro-skeptic and managers
or professionals to be Euro-supportive, whereas in labor-rich member 
states we expect the reverse (manual worker*gross national income and
professional*gross national income).1
Theories of public opinion derived from individual egocentric calcula-
tion have been extended in two directions. First, subjective as well as objective
factors have been taken into account. Second, sociotropic evaluations concern-
ing one’s group (in this case, country) can be theorized alongside egocentric
evaluations. The corresponding four lines of theorizing are represented in
Figure 1.
Citizens may be sensitive to their sociotropic or collective economic
circumstances (cell II in Figure 1), as well as to those that affect them indi-
vidually (cell I in Figure 1). It seems reasonable to expect residents of countries
that are net recipients of European Union spending to support European inte-
gration, and those in donor countries to oppose it (fiscal transfer) (Anderson
and Reichert, 1996; Brinegar et al., 2004; Diez Medrano, 2003). The same logic
is often at work in regional or federal states, where poorer regions champion
centralization to increase redistribution whereas prosperous regions favor
decentralization (Bolton and Roland, 1997).
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Sociotropic preferences may be shaped by political-economic institutions
(Brinegar et al., 2004; Ray, 2004). The European Union encompasses countries
with contrasting systems of economic coordination: liberal, social democratic,
continental/Christian democratic, and mixed (Hall and Soskice, 2001).
Citizens’ cost–benefit calculations concerning European integration are likely
to be influenced by the type of capitalism in which they live and work.
Political-economic institutions are costly to change, and hence we expect
citizens in more peripheral systems – liberal and social democratic – to be
Euro-skeptical (type of capitalism: liberal, social democratic, continental/Christian
democratic, mixed).
Subjective economic evaluations can be expected to influence public
opinion on European integration alongside objective factors (Anderson, 1998;
Christin, 2005; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Rohrschneider, 2002). European
integration is perceived by most citizens to shape their economic welfare in a
general sense. Citizens who feel confident about the economic future – person-
ally (cell III) and for their country (cell IV) – are likely to regard European inte-
gration in a positive light, whereas those who are fearful will lean towards
Euro-skepticism (personal economic prospects and national economic prospects).
The economic approach to public opinion is likely to be most valid when
economic consequences are perceived with some accuracy, when they are
large enough to matter, and when the choice a person makes actually affects
the outcome. To the extent that these conditions are not present, attitudes may
be sensitive to group identities (Chong, 2000; Elster, 1990; Sears and Funk,
1991; Young et al., 1991).
Identity
The premise of social identity theory is that ‘who one is’ depends on which
groups one identifies with. Humans evolved a capacity for intense group
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Figure 1 Economic models of public opinion on European integration.
 Objective evaluation Subjective evaluation 
Egocentric 
I
Education 
Manual  worker*GNI 
Professional*GNI 
III
Personal economic prospects 
Sociotropic 
II
Fiscal transfer 
Type of capitalism 
IV
National economic prospects 
loyalty long before the development of rational faculties. These loyalties can
be extremely powerful in shaping views towards political objects (Massey,
2002; Sears, 1993; Sniderman et al., 2004). The strongest territorial identities
are national, and we suspect that such identities constrain preferences
concerning European integration.
The European Union meshes national and European governments in a
system of multi-level governance that pools sovereignty over important
aspects of citizens’ lives. To the extent that European integration makes it
more difficult for national governments to pursue distinctly national prefer-
ences, it undermines national self-determination and blurs boundaries
between distinct national communities.
European integration reinforces multiculturalism. It erodes exclusionary
norms of ‘us’ and ‘them’ that are deeply rooted in the creation of European
national states. Kriesi and Lachat (2004) observe that individuals who
strongly identify with their national community and who support exclusion-
ary norms tend to perceive European integration as a threat. De Vreese and
Boomgaarden (2005) show that anti-immigration sentiment is associated with
Euro-skepticism. Similarly, McLaren finds that ‘[a]ntipathy toward the EU is
not just about cost/benefit calculations or about cognitive mobilization . . .
but about fear of, or hostility toward, other cultures’ (McLaren, 2002: 553).
Not only does European integration create economic losers and winners; it
provokes a sharp sense of identity loss among defenders of the nation
(national attachment) and among anti-cosmopolitans (multiculturalism).
The relationship between national identity and European integration is
double-edged. On the one hand, national identity and European identity may
reinforce each other (Citrin and Sides, 2004; Klandermans et al., 2003). It is
not unusual for citizens to have multiple identities – to feel, for example,
Catalan, Spanish, and European – at one and the same time (Diez Medrano
and Guttiérez, 2001; Marks, 1999; Marks and Llamazares, forthcoming).
Haesly (2001) finds positive, rather than negative, associations between Welsh
and European identities and between Scottish and European identities.
Klandermans and his co-authors (2003) detect a cumulative pattern of iden-
tities, in which farmers who identify with Europe tend also to identify with
their nation. Risse (2002) conceptualizes the relationship as akin to a marble
cake in which multiple identities are meshed together. Van Kersbergen (2000)
conceives of European allegiance as embedded in national allegiance. Citrin
and Sides find that ‘while the nation retains primacy in most people’s minds,
the growing sense of Europeanness implies that more people are integrating
a sense of belonging to two overlapping polities’ (2004: 170).
But it is also true that opposition to European integration is couched as
defense of the nation against control from Brussels. Radical right political
parties in France, Denmark, Italy, Belgium, and Austria tap nationalism to
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reject further integration, and since 1996 such parties have formed the largest
reservoir of Euro-skepticism in the EU as a whole (Hooghe et al., 2002;
Taggart, 1998). Christin and Trechsel (2002) find that the stronger the national
attachment and national pride of Swiss citizens, the less likely they are to
support membership in the European Union. Carey (2002) shows that national
attachment combined with national pride has a significant negative effect on
support for European integration. Luedtke (2005) finds a strong negative
association between national identity and support for EU immigration policy.
To resolve these conflicting expectations, we need to theorize how
national identity can both reinforce and undermine support for European
integration. Diez Medrano (2003) argues that national histories are crucial.
Analyzing patterns of discourse in the UK, Spain, and Germany, Medrano
finds that English Euro-skepticism is rooted in Britain’s special history of
empire, that West German pro-Europeanism reflects Second World War guilt,
and that the Spanish tend to support European integration as proxy for
modernization and democratization (Diez Medrano, 2003). A research team
led by Stråth and Triandafyllidou (2003) links party programs, public opinion,
educational curricula, and media within nine EU countries. These studies
emphasize the stickiness of national identity within unique national contexts.
Can one generalize about the connection between national identity and
public opinion? We begin with the basic distinction between exclusive and
inclusive national identity, and we hypothesize that citizens who conceive of
their national identity as exclusive of other territorial identities are predis-
posed to be considerably more Euro-skeptical than are those who conceive
their national identity in inclusive terms (exclusive national identity). We know,
for example, that individuals who identify themselves exclusively as Belgian
or exclusively as Flemish are more likely to oppose multi-level governance
than are those who identify themselves as both Belgian and Flemish
(Maddens et al., 1996). We expect to find something similar at the supra-
national level (Hooghe and Marks, 2004).
However, the impact of identity on political attitudes is neither automatic
nor uniform (Diez Medrano, 2003; Kriesi and Lachat, 2004). The connection
between individuals’ communal identity and their attitude toward European
integration appears to be politically constructed, as we theorize in the next
section.
Political cues
The premise of cue theory is that underlying values and interests need to be
primed to become politically salient. An experiment examining immigrant
attitudes among Dutch citizens finds that individuals who are prompted to
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think about national identity are much more likely to oppose immigration
than are respondents whose personal identity is primed (Sniderman et al.,
2004). This has directed attention to cognitive short-cuts, contextual factors,
and elite cues, each of which help a person respond to a survey question about
an issue that is seldom on his or her mind (Feldman, 1988; Steenbergen and
Jones, 2002; Zaller, 1992).
The cues that appear most relevant to European integration arise in
member states. The European Union is part of a system of multi-level govern-
ance that encompasses domestic political arenas, and so one would expect
domestic politics to shape public views on European integration. A stream of
research examines how national contexts frame views on European integra-
tion. Taking off from Franklin et al.’s ‘uncorking the bottle’ model (1994 and
1995) and Anderson’s national proxies model (1998), this research emphasizes
the quality of national governance (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000), national demo-
cratic performance (Rohrschneider, 2002), or incumbent support and political
ideology (Ray, 2003a). Here we hypothesize that public opinion is constrained
by political ideology, political parties, and political elites in those domestic
arenas.
Political choice in European domestic politics is structured by a general
left/right dimension. Previous research has found that this dimension – in
the aggregate – has little bite on public opinion on European integration
(left/right) (Ray, 2003a, 2003b; Van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996). But some
writers have suggested that the implications of left and right for public
opinion on European integration depend on a country’s political-economic
institutions (Brinegar et al., 2004; Brinegar and Jolly, 2005; Marks, 2004; Ray,
2004). In most countries, European integration has become a left-leaning
project because it holds out the prospect of continental-wide regulation.
However, citizens in social democratic societies are likely to perceive
European integration as a source of regulatory competition, and hence as a
constraint on market regulation. Hence in social democratic systems, we
expect the Left to be opposed to European integration and the Right to be
supportive (left/right*social democratic capitalism).
Literature on American public opinion suggests that citizens are cued by
political elites (Druckman, 2001; Zaller, 1992: 97–117). In Europe, the most
important political organizations connecting elites to the public are political
parties, and we hypothesize that individuals who say that they support a
particular party will tend to follow that party’s position on European inte-
gration (party cue) (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). Cues are likely to be
strongest when elites conflict over an issue (Ray, 2003b; Steenbergen and Scott,
2004). Elite conflict punctures passive support for European integration –
transforming the ‘permissive consensus’ that predominated during the EU’s
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first three decades into a ‘constraining dissensus’. We hypothesize that the
greater the divisions among political parties and national elites on European
integration, the more citizens are likely to oppose the process (elite division).
We follow Zaller (1992), Ray (2003b), and Steenbergen and Jones (2002) by
modeling the causality as elite driven.2
Research on national political parties tells us that conflict over European
integration has, in large part, become a struggle over national community
values: what does it mean to be British, French, or Greek, and how does this
connect to European integration? We hypothesize that citizens who see them-
selves as exclusively national are particularly receptive to elite warnings that
European integration harbors unacceptable foreign influence. We theorize an
interaction: the deeper elite division in a country, the more will exclusive
national identity be harnessed against European integration (elite
division*exclusive national identity). In countries where the elite is divided on the
issue, exclusive national identity is likely to rear its head. In countries where
the elite is squarely behind the European project, we expect national identity
to lie dormant or to be positively associated with support for integration.
Models
Table 1 summarizes 11 models of public opinion on European integration.
The table lists the dependent variable used in each analysis, the method of
analysis, the proportion of the variance explained, and, in italics, the most
powerful independent variables. These models are, in our view, the most
interesting, influential, and/or original analyses to have appeared over the
past decade. They also represent the major directions in theorizing. Direct
comparison of results across these models is complicated because the depen-
dent variable varies, as do populations, time points, and methods. But some
general lessons can be learned.
Most models, like the field as a whole, emphasize political-economic vari-
ables. Identities are far less prominent, though we over-sample in this respect
by including McLaren’s cultural threat model (2002), Carey’s identity model
(2002), and Diez Medrano’s framing Europe model (2003).
The European Union is a moving target, and it is not surprising that
analyses of public opinion have changed over time. Up to the mid-1990s and
the Maastricht Treaty, the EU was essentially a means to institutionalize
market integration, and analyses of public opinion reflected this. Gabel’s book
Interests and Integration (1998b), from which we draw the policy appraisal and
national political economy models, is primarily concerned with economic
costs and benefits, as is Anderson and Reichert’s economic benefits model
(1996). Another stream of work (not represented in Table 1) examines 
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cross-national variation in support in terms of aggregate economic factors
(Carrubba, 1997; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993 and 2003).
Several models engage domestic politics. Anderson’s national proxies
model (1998), Rohrschneider’s democratic performance model (2002), and
Steenbergen and Jones’ party cue model (2002) draw attention to national
political-institutional variables, of which party support or party cue appear
especially powerful. Brinegar et al.’s types of capitalism model (2004) high-
lights how national political-economic institutions refract left/right position-
ing on European integration.
In the 1990s, elite conflict on Europe intensified, radical right parties
became the Euro-skeptical vanguard, and scholars began to analyze
communal identities as sources of public opinion. Carey’s identity model
(2002) provides evidence that regional, national, and European identities
structure EU public opinion. McLaren’s cultural threat model (2002) demon-
strates that negative attitudes towards the EU reflect general hostility toward
other cultures. Diez Medrano’s model (2003) attempts to generalize how
different national histories frame conceptions of national identity and Europe.
Our analysis builds on these insights. We compare the relative influence
of economic calculation and communal identity, and we propose a simple,
but encompassing, model that explains around one-third of the variance in
public support for European integration.
Method and data
To measure support for European integration we combine three complemen-
tary elements of support: the principle of membership, the desired speed of
integration, and the desired direction of future integration. The results
reported below are robust across these component measures. This and other
variables in our analysis are detailed in the appendix (see the appendix3 also
for descriptive statistics).4
We use multi-level analysis to probe variation at the individual, party,
and country level. Our presumption is that political parties and countries are
irreducible political contexts that interact with individual attributes to
produce political effects – in this case, support for or opposition to European
integration. To the extent that individuals are clustered in parties and
countries, they should not be regarded as independent units of analysis.
Ignoring this biases standard errors because residuals will co-vary across the
higher-level groups. By specifying predictors for clustered data across the
relevant clusters, one is less likely to mis-specify parameters (Steenbergen and
Jones, 2002).
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Table 1 Public opinion on European integration
Gabel/Palmer’s Anderson/ Reichert Gabel’s Gabel’s national Brinegar et al.’s 
economic voting economic benefits policy-appraisal  political economy types of capitalism 
Economic models model (1995) model (1996) model (1998b) model (1998c) model (2004)
Dependent variable Membership + Membership Membership Membership Perceived/desired 
unification speed
Economic calculation
Individual factors Occupation, income, Occupation,c income, Occupation,d income, Human capital,a
education, proximity education education, proximity relative wage,e
to border to border occupation
Collective factors Evaluation of EU trade, budget EU trade Type of capitalism, 
national economy,a returns Structural funding
national benefitb
Community and identity
Cultural threat
Identity
Political cues
Ideology/values Postmaterialism Values,h left/right 
self-placement
Party/elite cues Political stabilityf Party cuei
Other political cues
Other factors
Gender, age, length Gender, age Geopolitical 
of membership securityg
Country dummies Yes No Yes Yes No
Method OLS pooled time OLS over different OLS pooled time OLS pooled time OLS 
series (EU) years (EU) series (EU) series (EU) (EU)
R2 .38 .04–.10 .13–.14 .11–.13 .17
Notes: The strongest variables in each model are italicized.
a Retrospective evaluation. b Benefit question. c Dummy for farmer. d Dummies: farmer, professional, manual worker. e Occupation/ income interaction. f % vote parties opposing democratic capitalism. g WWII deaths. h Views
on welfare state, gender equality. i See Steenbergen and Jones (2002).
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Table 1 Continued
Anderson’s national Rohrschneider’s  Steenbergen/ Jones’ McLaren’s cultural Carey’s identity Diez Medrano’s 
proxies model democracy model party cue model threat model model framing Europe model 
Non-economic models (1998) (2002) (2002) (2002) (2002) (2003)
Dependent variable Membership Support for EU Membership + Membership + Membership Index of support for 
governmentc desired speed benefit EMU and CFSP
Economic calculation
Individual factors Evaluation of Evaluation of Occupation, income, Occupation, income, Occupation, income, 
personal economy personal economy education, proximity education; evaluation education
to border of personal economy
Collective factors Evaluation of national Evaluation of single Perceived economic Evaluation of national Inflation, growth, trade, 
economy market, national economy threate economy objective 1 region
Community and identity
Cultural threat Perceived cultural Perceived cultural Perceived cultural 
threat f threatg threat
Identity national pride,h European attachment
territorial attachment i
Political cues
Ideology/values Post-materialism Left/right self-placement
Party/elite cues Party support a Party cued Party support j
Other political cues System support,b Perception EU 
government support representation, 
satisfaction with 
EU democracy
Other factors
Opinion leadership Opinion leadership Catholic country; 
distance to Brusselsk
Country dummies Not applicable Not applicable No Yes Yes No
Method OLS OLS; multi-level Multi-level analysis OLS Ordered LOGIT Multi-level analysis
(individual countries) analysis (EU) (EU) (EU) (EU)
(individual countries)
R2 .09–0.20 .23–0.40 .09 .17–.21 59% correct .21
Notes: The strongest variables in each model are italicized.
a Voted for establishment party. b Satisfaction with national democracy. c (1) EU government responsible to EU Parliament? (2) More power for EP good/bad? (3) EP more/less important role? d EU support among political parties,
assigned as value to party supporters. e Minorities abuse social benefits. f Religious practices of minorities threaten way of life. g EU threatens national identity, language. h Interaction national pride, exclusive national identity.
i Local, region, nation, Europe. j Government party; working class vs. bourgeois party. k Also WWII deaths, new democracy.
We use five controls throughout. Consistent with prior work, we expect
support to be greater among opinion leaders, respondents knowledgeable
about European politics, men, and younger individuals. We also control for
European attachment so that our measure of exclusive national identity does not
tap absence of European identity. European attachment is strongly associated
with support for European integration (R = .30), and its inclusion as a control
variable imposes conservatism in estimating the significance and effect of
identity variables of theoretical interest.
Results
Let us begin by examining the extent to which variation in public opinion on
European integration is clustered among countries and political parties. An
empty ANOVA model partitions the total variance into discrete variance
components. The ANOVA model, hereafter described as the base model, is
shown in Table 2. The individual level accounts for 76.6% of the variance
across the sample; the party level accounts for 9.1%; and the country level
accounts for 14.3%.
Table 3 presents the results of the multi-level analysis. Each of the theories
we discuss has some power. Models 1 and 2 confirm that citizens respond to
economic stimuli. Variables that tap occupation along with personal and
collective expectations are significant in both models, though they are not
particularly powerful when compared with variables that tap type of capital-
ism (model 1) or fiscal redistribution among countries (model 2).
In model 1, mean support for European integration is more than 25 points
lower (on a 100-point scale) in Scandinavian social democratic political
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Table 2 The base model
Unstandardized Standard
coefficients errors
Fixed effects: constant 64.697** 2.965
Variance components
Country level 110.838** 46.446
Party level 70.261** 13.013
Individual level 593.384** 9.669
–2* log likelihood 70985
Note: * p < .01 ** p < .001
economies than in our reference category, the mixed political economies of
France and southern Europe. Model 1 accounts for almost four-fifths of the
country variance in our data, considerably more than model 2 or model 3.
But what can one infer from the strength of dichotomous varieties of capital-
ism variables? The three dummy variables in model 1 specify groupings of
countries that share distinctive social, political, and cultural features along-
side particular types of capitalism. To be sure, Scandinavians tend to be far
more Euro-skeptical than southern Europeans, but is this because they have
a distinctive political economy, or because Scandinavians have particular
identities that lead them to resist rule from Brussels?
To probe further, one must replace country names with variables. In
model 2 we replace the dummies representing groups of countries with a
measure of fiscal redistribution. Because most redistribution in the EU is from
the richer countries of the north to the poorer countries in the south, fiscal
transfer is strongly correlated (R > .30) with three of the dummy variables
for country groupings. Adding the variable to model 1 creates unstable
coefficients. In model 2 and under the controls exerted in subsequent models,
fiscal transfer is significant and powerful.
Figure 2 illustrates this by estimating the relative effect of eight influen-
tial independent variables, including fiscal transfer. The solid boxes encom-
pass the inter-quartile range and the whiskers indicate the range between the
5th and the 95th percentile, holding all other independent variables at their
means. An individual in Germany at the 5th percentile on fiscal transfer has a
mean score of 66.3 on support for European integration, whereas an individual
in Greece, at the 95th percentile, has a mean score of 81.5, controlling for all
other variables in our analysis. The differing length of the 95% whiskers in
Figure 2 for this variable indicates that its association with support for
European integration is not linear. Fiscal transfer sharply delineates four
countries (Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland) that receive the bulk of
cohesion funding and that tend to be pro-EU.
Three variables that tap identity – exclusive national identity, multicultural-
ism, and national attachment – are featured in model 3. This model is not as
efficient as either model 1 or model 2 in accounting for country variance, but
it is considerably better at explaining variance at the party and at the indi-
vidual level. The reduction in the chi-square (–2*log likelihood) from model
2 to model 3 is 714, and model 3 costs four fewer degrees of freedom. This
identity model explains 21.9% of the total variance (excluding European
attachment).
The double-edged character of identity is apparent: national identity both
contributes to, and diminishes, support for European integration. Attachment
to one’s country is positively correlated with support for European integration
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Figure 2 Effects of independent variables.
in bivariate analysis.5 But national identity is Janus-faced: in some circum-
stances it collides with European integration.
The extent to which national identity is exclusive or inclusive is decisive.
A Eurobarometer question compels respondents to place either European or
national identity above the other, and separates those who say they think of
themselves as ‘only British (or French, etc.)’ from those who say they have
some form of multiple identity. Estimates for exclusive national identity are
negative, substantively large, and significant in the presence of any and all
controls we exert. On average, and controlling for all other variables, an indi-
vidual in our sample who claims an exclusive national identity scores 63.2 on
our scale for support for European integration, compared with 76.1 for a
person who does not. The difference, 12.9%, is indicated by the solid box in
Figure 2.
Two methodological issues arise in relation to our claim that national
identity shapes public opinion on European integration. The first concerns
causal priority. Is national identity exogenous with respect to public support
for European integration? Are we right to assume that national identity causes
support, and not the reverse? Our approach is confirmed by empirical
research arguing that national factors shape public attitudes on European
integration, rather than the reverse (Kritzinger, 2003; Van Kersbergen, 2000).
It seems plausible to place identities, especially national identities, earlier in
the causal chain than support for or opposition to a particular political system,
particularly one as distant to most citizens as the European Union. National
identities are more deeply rooted in respondents’ minds than are attitudes
towards European integration, and, to the extent that one finds an association
between them, it seems sensible to argue that identities are causally prior.
The second issue concerns measurement. The Eurobarometer question
concerning exclusive national identity is far from perfect for our purpose. The
measure we use taps national identity by asking whether respondents see
themselves as exclusively national or have some form of national and
European identity. We control for European attachment to diminish the influ-
ence of European identity in our results. We also find that degrees of European
identity – whether respondents say they see themselves as national first or
European first – have little statistical bite. Consistent with our exclusive
national identity argument, the difference between respondents with exclus-
ive national identity and any form of mixed identity is considerably greater
than the differences among those with varying forms of mixed identity.
Average support for European integration is 53.3 on our scale for respondents
who have exclusive national identity, and varies between 75.1 and 80.4 across
the remaining categories. The active agent in our analysis is, therefore, the
divide between individuals with exclusive national identity and those who
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Table 3 Public opinion on European integration: Calculation, community, cues
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Constant (fixed effects) 81.156** 70.290** 76.216** 74.032** 75.570** 70.550**
(2.792) (2.653) (2.760) (2.295) (1.840) (1.709)
Economic calculation (fixed effects)
Education 1.543** 1.527** 0.997* 0.970* 0.927*
(0.357) (0.357) (0.340) (0.339) (0.338)
Professional/manager*gross national income 0.119* 0.118* 0.079 0.072 0.069
(0.046) (0.046) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043)
Manual worker*gross national income –0.065* –0.065 –0.040 –0.035 –0.033
(0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Personal economic prospects 2.368** 2.378** 2.257** 2.334** 2.314**
(0.649) (0.649) (0.616) (0.615) (0.615)
National economic prospects 4.018** 3.994** 3.125** 3.025** 3.115**
(0.468) (0.468) (0.446) (0.445) (0.444)
Fiscal transfer 4.633* 4.525** 3.408** 3.330**
(1.589) (1.333) (1.014) (0.864)
Capitalism: liberal –16.263**
(4.841)
Capitalism: continental/Christian democratic –11.257*
(3.809)
Capitalism: social democratic –25.419**
(4.134)
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Table 3 continued
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Community and identity (fixed effects)
National attachment –1.598** –1.638** –1.699** –1.691**
(0.420) (0.418) (0.416) (0.415)
Exclusive national identity –13.260** –12.954** –12.835**
(0.562) (0.560) (0.559)
Multiculturalism 4.532** 4.191** 4.173** 4.153**
(0.310) (0.310) (0.309) (0.309)
Political cues (fixed effects)
Left/right 0.039 –0.312
(0.138) (0.144)
Party cue 2.417** 2.317**
(0.241) (0.221)
Elite division –6.439**
(2.191)
Elite division*exclusive national identity –5.136**
(0.223)
Left/right*social democratic capitalism 1.580**
(0.294)
–2 *log likelihood 69683 69695 68981 68853 68787 68769
R2 (including European attachment) .26 .20 .25 .31 .37 .38
R2 (excluding European attachment) .19 .12 .22 .27 .34 .34
Notes: Multi-level analysis using MLWiN. N = 7641; countries equally weighted.
* p < .01, ** p < .001 
attest to some mix of inclusive national and European identity rather than
between those who have different degrees of mixed identity.
Model 4 combines economic and identity variables and is a large
improvement over models 1 to 3. This model reveals that economic and
identity variables tap different aspects of public opinion. Model 5 introduces
political parties, elite divisions, and left/right ideology. Party cue is the fifth
most powerful variable in Figure 2, while divisions within and across politi-
cal parties and divisions within the political elite, summarized by the variable
elite division, are extraordinarily influential. The inter-quartile range in Figure
2 for elite division is second only to that for exclusive national identity. A citizen
in Sweden, the country with the most divided elite, scores on average 60.8
on our scale for support for European integration, whereas a citizen in Spain,
with the least divided elite, scores 76.1. This 5–95% range is represented by
the whiskers in Figure 2. Model 5 explains 33.5% of total variance when we
strip out the effect of European attachment, and it is more powerful than any
model in Table 1.6
Model 6, our final model, is in one key respect simpler than model 5. It
combines the two most influential variables in model 5, elite division and exclus-
ive national identity, into a single interactive term that provides information
about the level of elite division only for individuals having exclusive national
identity. Our hunch, derived from what we know about American public
opinion, seems to be on the right track: divisions within a country’s elite
interact with exclusive national identity to shape attitudes on European inte-
gration. Model 6 includes another interaction term, left/right*social democratic
capitalism, which has a significant positive coefficient consistent with our
hypothesis that political-economic institutions refract ideological positioning.
In social democratic systems, the Left’s response to European integration is
framed by its defense of welfare provisions that appear anomalous in a wider
European context, whereas the political Right welcomes European norms.
Conclusion
The European Union is an extremely versatile institution. It is an international
regime that facilitates economic exchange; it is a supranational polity that
exerts political authority over its citizens; and it is part of a system of multi-
level governance that encompasses national politics. In this paper we show
that the motivations underlying public opinion on European integration draw
on all three perspectives. Citizens take the economic consequences of market
integration into account, both for themselves and for their countries. They
evaluate European integration in terms of their communal identities and their
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views towards foreigners and foreign cultures. Further, their attitudes are
cued by their ideological placement and by elites and political parties.
A multi-level model that synthesizes these perspectives is considerably
more powerful than one that does not. The model we put forward in this
paper uses 12 degrees of freedom to account for 25.6% of variance at the indi-
vidual level and almost all variance at the country and party levels. Compari-
son with prior models is not easy given variations in method and dependent
variables, but, for the first time, readers can review leading models and their
basic findings side by side.
Economic interests and communal identities do not speak with a single
voice across the European Union, but interact with national institutions and
elites. The implications of ideology for public opinion on European integra-
tion vary with the expected effect of integration on welfare states. More inte-
gration means one thing for welfare spending in a country such as the UK,
which has a low level, and quite another in a country such as Sweden, where
welfare spending is high. This is reflected in ideological positioning with
respect to European integration.
We find that exclusive national identity provides a key to public opinion,
but the extent to which exclusive national identity bites on support for
European integration depends on how divided national elites are. Where elites
are united on Europe, national identity and European integration tend to
coexist; where they are divided, national identity produces Euro-skepticism.
National identities are formed early in life. Children as young as six or
seven know full well whether they are Spanish, German, or Swedish
(Druckman, 1994). Yet the political consequences of national identity are
constructed in debate and conflict. We suggest that such construction takes
place primarily in domestic arenas, and is cued by political elites and politi-
cal parties, but we need better data, and data over time, to delve more deeply
into the causal connections between elite and public attitudes.
Theories of public opinion on European integration have lagged behind
first-hand description. Journalists and close observers of the public mood
have for some time emphasized that national identities constrain support for
European integration, yet all but a few scholarly analyses have focused on
economic calculation. Our finding that identity is influential for public
opinion on European integration extends research linking identity concep-
tions to attitudes on immigration and race (Citrin et al., 1990; De Vreese and
Boomgaarden, 2005; Luedtke, 2005; Sears, 1993; Sniderman et al., 2004).
Our analysis suggests that the influence of communal identities may
reach well beyond race or immigration. A policy with clear distributional
consequences may still be evaluated as an identity issue. Research on trade
liberalization has produced the unexplained finding that citizens with strong
Hooghe and Marks Calculation, Community and Cues 4 3 7
national attachment tend to oppose trade liberalization both in the United
States and across OECD countries. National attachment appears to be a more
powerful influence than conventional economic factors, a finding that is all
the more striking because it has emerged in two independent tests of
economic, not identity, theories (O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2001; Mayda and
Rodrik, 2002). Clearly, we have much to learn about how economic calcula-
tion and identity shape public opinion, and about how their effects vary
across political contexts.
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1 The literature is divided on how to test this hypothesis. Gabel (1998c) inter-
acts occupational dummies for low- and high-skilled individuals with relative
wages (or income). This operationalization has been criticized on the grounds
that relative wage/income data at the individual level do not adequately
capture variation in national contexts (Brinegar and Jolly, 2005). We follow
Gabel by interacting occupation with income, but we use a national variable
– gross national income (GNI) – to tap country variation.
2 This assumption is controversial, and has been recently challenged
(Carrubba, 2001; Gabel and Scheve, 2004). It seems sensible to model the
party–public interaction as conditional on the salience of an issue for the
public. Recent data and research suggest that European integration has
indeed become salient in some recent national elections, though it is not clear
how this has varied over time (Evans, 1999; Netjes, 2004; Tilman, 2004).
3 The appendix can be found on the EUP web page.
4 Data are from Eurobarometer 54.1 (Hartung, 2002; fieldwork in Fall 2000).
The data set was made available by the Mannheimer Zentrum für Umfragen,
Methoden und Analysen (ZUMA). We include only respondents for whom
we have values on all variables in the full model to assure commensurabil-
ity across explanatory models, and we weight each country to have equal
sample size. Neither of these decisions affects our results. There are no
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significant differences in means and standard deviations between our
restricted sample and the full sample (minus Luxembourg, and each country
equally weighted; see appendix). No variables reported here shift in sign or
significance across the restricted and full samples or across weighted and
unweighted samples.
5 The association between national attachment and support for European integra-
tion is usually insignificant under controls, and becomes negative when we
control for European attachment.
6 When we follow Gabel and Palmer (1995) and include national benefit (‘Do
you believe your country has benefited from European integration’) on the
left-hand side of the equation along with country dummies, model 5 explains
42.6% of the variance.
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